Representing more-than-humans

“Most accounts of how to represent nonhuman nature rely on humans adopting the role of nature's trustees, and the authority of such trustees generally rests on scientific research, moral intuition, empathic understanding, indigenous culture, or some other form of knowledge broadly defined (Carbone, 2004; Eckersley, 2004: 121-126; Goodin, 1996; O'Neill, 2001: 494-495; Schlosberg, 2007: 193-199).2 According to Goodin (1996: 844), for example, humans can best represent nonhumans by discerning and internalizing their interests and then acting with those interests in mind. Dobson (1996: 137) proposes that nonhumans could be represented by human "proxy-representatives," who would be elected by a designated "sustain-ability lobby" comprised of professionals charged with determining the conditions under which the animals, species, or habitats in question will survive and flourish. Dryzek (2000: 149) recom-mends that we respectfully "listen to signals emanating from the natural world" and then rely on those signals to assess nature's interests. Eckersley (2011: 237) sees nature's representatives as "self-appointed guardians or trustees of nature who want the community at large to share in the duty of care they feel towards their ward." These accounts often assert an analogy between the political inclusion of nonhumans and the inclusion of women, ethnic minorities, and other previously excluded social groups (Dobson, 2010: 753; Eckersley, 2011: 241, 244-49; Latour, 2004: 69). These accounts also generally acknowledge that nonhumans cannot directly authorize their representatives or hold them accountable. And as O'Neill (2001) points out, humans who represent nonhumans probably cannot claim authority based on perceived resemblance or likeness between themselves and those they represent. So most accounts argue that science, morality, or other epistemic resources can be used to discern the interests of nonhuman nature and justify claims to represent it (Eckersley, 2011: 252; O'Neill, 2001: 496). From this perspective, the authority of nature's representatives depends primarily on their claim to know something about nature.
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With regard to epistemology, the correspond-ence view of representation has long been persua-sively challenged by constructivist approaches in pragmatist and feminist philosophy, science and technology studies, and related fields (Jasanoff et al., 1995). From a constructivist perspective, representations of nonhuman nature—whether in science, art, morality, or politics — are always partly constituted by cultural values, social interests, and political decisions.” *

Representating more-than-humans